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T
he growing number of troubled mortgages in New England poses challenges for 
local communities. As foreclosures mount, so do the number of vacant homes, 
given that most properties that do not sell at auction remain in the hands of the 
foreclosing lender. These foreclosed properties, known as lender-owned or real 
estate owned (REO) properties, present an obstacle to preserving healthy neighborhoods. 
The  negative  spillover  effects  of  lender-owned  properties  on  housing  values  in  the 
surrounding neighborhood have been well documented, notably by Dan Immergluck and 
Geoff Smith.2 Other problems connected to rising foreclosures include municipal tax revenue 
losses, higher crime rates, and general social disruption. 
There are clear public benefits to preventing foreclosures, but efforts to do so have been 
slow and complicated. Some borrowers would be able to remain in their homes with a 
moderate change in the terms of their loan, but the steep fall in house prices and the rising 
delinquency rates mean some foreclosures are inevitable. As of late 2008, there was no 
government or private-sector program mitigating foreclosures in any substantial way.  
For borrowers who are unable to afford their property even with a reasonable loan modi-
fication, the best solution may be to help them transition to rental housing. Then, to preserve 
the neighborhood, the best solution would be to find a new buyer for the property. However, 
the weak housing market has resulted in light demand for foreclosed properties at a price 
that is acceptable to the selling party, the lender. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston economist 
Paul Willen looked at nearly 20 years of property data from the Massachusetts Registry of 
Deeds and found that lenders find it much more difficult to sell foreclosed property when 
the market is down, especially in low- to moderate-income areas. Another recent study on 
foreclosure sales by Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak found that these properties eventually sell 
at a substantial price discount, about 32 percent less than the prevailing market value. The 
longer a property takes to sell, the bigger the discount.  
Foreclosed properties sell at a discount for a number of reasons. They tend to be in greater 
need of rehabilitation; they are at greater risk of having a title problem or an unpaid lien; 
and in general there is more uncertainty about their condition. The sellers (often absentee 
sellers) also tend to be anxious to be rid of the property and its holding costs. Because of this, 
1     A version of this article appears in New England Community Developments, Issue 3 (2008), Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/necd/index.htm.
2     For a literature review of the price-depressing spillover effects of foreclosures, see Kai-yan Lee (2008).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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foreclosed properties may be more attractive to speculators looking to turn a quick profit 
without undertaking necessary repairs. 
States and municipalities know they must respond quickly. But the question is how best 
to do so. This article aims to help answer this question by highlighting the response in 
Massachusetts—including the creation of a foreclosed-property task force, a revolving loan 
fund, and an online database of foreclosed properties open to nonprofits and municipalities 
working to stabilize neighborhoods—as a potential model for other states. I describe these 
efforts and discuss some of the obstacles and recent trends facing the state. 
The Massachusetts Response
Massachusetts had three advantages that allowed it to recognize the magnitude of the 
foreclosure problem early on and address it quickly. The first is the recent history of a housing 
market downturn. Affordable-housing developers, municipal leaders, and others remember 
the sharp housing downturn in New England during the economic recession and rash of 
banking failures in the early 1990s. The rise in foreclosures and the associated blight and 
even arson caused community advocates to remark at the time that the situation threatened 
to undo the progress the community development field had made over the previous two 
decades. 
Second, to date, the fall in housing prices in Massachusetts has not been as steep as in 
the most hard-hit states like Florida, California, and Nevada. Nor has the economic situation 
been as dire as that of the auto-manufacturing regions now facing large-scale unemploy-
ment—Ohio and Michigan, for example. 
The Commonwealth’s other advantage has been the collaborative nature of its nonprofits 
and public agencies. As groups began to understand the scale of the problem, many looked 
for opportunities to share knowledge and resources. One result of these efforts was the 
Mortgage Summit task force convened in November 2006 by the Massachusetts Division 
of Banks.  
The group was set up to inform a larger state process involving other state agencies, 
the attorney general, the mayor of Boston, and state legislators. The collaboration eventu-
ally resulted in the 2007 Act Protecting and Preserving Homeownership, which strength-
ened consumer protections in the mortgage market. The act included measures aimed at 
providing relief to borrowers, such as a 90-day Right to Cure provision. In effect since May 
1, 2008, this provision provides a statutory right to cure for holders of a residential mort-
gage, beginning from the time they receive a notice of default and right to cure from their 
lender.   The measure also protects the borrower from being required to pay charges or fees 
related to the exercise of this right, including any attorney fees charged by the lender. Its 
main purpose is to allow the borrower time to pursue a loan modification or short sale, or 
find another method to prevent foreclosure. Other measures, such as restrictions on the use 
of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages and a requirement that brokers be licensed, were 
aimed at preventing future abuses.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Foreclosed Property Task Force
Though the implementation of the Right to Cure provision in May 2008 slowed the 
inflow of foreclosed properties into REO stock, foreclosures continue to occur at elevated 
levels. Chart 1 shows the sharp increase in REO properties since 2006.  
Chart 1. Massachusetts Real-Estate-Owned Property Count
Wanting to get ahead of the problem, representatives from affordable-housing developers, 
community groups, municipal and state officials, public and quasi-public agencies, and 
other parties met at a forum convened by the Massachusetts Association of Community 
Development Corporations (MACDC), the Urban Land Institute, and the Citizens’ Housing 
and Planning Authority (CHAPA). At the meeting, a foreclosed property task force was 
initiated, with funding provided by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership and the Boston 
Foundation. The task force sought participation from a variety of stakeholders. 
The task force split into five subcommittees, each of which was charged with addressing 
different aspects of foreclosed properties. The first subcommittee sought to identify sources of 
financing for acquiring properties, including public and private subsidies. The second explored 
techniques and mechanisms for acquiring properties from lenders. The third examined the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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holding costs incurred in the period between the time a property is acquired and the time 
it is sold or otherwise transferred. The fourth looked at exit strategies, including converting 
housing into rental units, land banking, sales to new homebuyers, and even demolition; the 
final, related subcommittee sought ways to match homebuyers to foreclosed properties. 
Throughout, the task force prioritized certain test communities like Chelsea and Lawrence, 
which were already in the process of acquiring or seeking to acquire properties. These cities 
and towns served as test cases for implementation, providing information that was fed back 
into the design process. The work of the task force gave participants a deeper understanding of 
the acquisition process and resulted in specific work products. These findings and outcomes 
were contained in a final report by CHAPA.3 I present some of the key points here. 
The report shared emerging practices, provided estimations of holding costs and prop-
erty taxes, and outlined models of exit strategies, including a receivership model used in 
Worcester. It also highlighted a major accomplishment for the task force, which was the 
establishment of a $20 million revolving loan fund designed to facilitate the purchase of fore-
closed properties by municipalities, nonprofits, or even for-profit developers. As much as $17 
million of the funding was pledged by the Massachusetts Housing Investment Corporation 
(MHIC), a public agency, and the Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP), a quasi-public 
organization. Two private foundations—The Boston Foundation and the Hyams Foundation, 
along with the nonprofit Living Cities—pledged funds to cover some of the “soft” costs of 
the effort, such as predevelopment costs. The Massachusetts Department of Housing and 
Community Development pledged an additional $1 million. 
One often-cited problem in trying to purchase a foreclosed property was dealing with 
the new owner of the property, typically the servicer of the foreclosed borrower. Finding out 
that a property had been foreclosed upon, determining the new holder of the title, and then 
finding good contact information for the owner was difficult. Many nonprofits reported 
difficulty finding someone within a firm that had knowledge of the organization’s REO 
portfolio. Often servicers had outsourced REO sales to another company but kept some 
control over the decision-making process. 
Finally, task force participants initially found that an underlying difference in judgment 
about the value of foreclosed properties in these neighborhoods slowed the process. Sellers 
had yet to come down sufficiently in price to match buyer expectations, given the severity 
of the market decline and the likely rehab costs.4 Appraisals were also difficult because they 
depend on the eventual use of the property. More recently, nonprofits have begun to report 
successful purchases of foreclosed properties, albeit with considerable staff effort.
3  Massachusetts Foreclosed Properties Task Force: A Report on Its Accomplishments, Recommendations for Next Steps and 
Lessons for Addressing Future Crises. Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association, September 2008.
4  It is too early to tell whether this difference in valuation is temporary, or whether they represent fundamental 
differences.  One possible explanation is that nonprofits have a different set of considerations than other for-
profit buyers, such as renovating to a higher standard of rehabilitation (for example, in including energy-effi-
cient appliances or higher-quality renovations, or meeting Section 8 tenant requirements) or desiring to fill the 
property more quickly, and so need to leave more room in the purchase price to allow for these preferences.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Some task force members—nonprofits and certain cities—wished to purchase a pool of 
properties held by a single servicer in their community. This would allow for economies of 
scale and ideally a lower price per property resulting from a bulk sale. But as of this writing, 
there were no such successful bulk sales in Massachusetts. 
Creation of an Online Database of Foreclosed Properties
Several task force members reported that they subscribed to data from the Warren Group, 
a real estate information provider, which provides weekly updates of data for foreclosed prop-
erties based on records filed with the state Registry of Deeds. CHAPA and several members 
of the task force began working with a consultant to create an online database with enhanced 
tracking tools that many nonprofits and municipalities could use, with monthly subscriptions 
starting at $40 per month. CHAPA entered into a licensing agreement with the Warren Group 
to purchase statewide foreclosure data. The database includes the following information:
•	 Property	address
•	 Current	state	in	the	foreclosure	process	(REO	status	and	whether	initial	notice	has	




Users of the database are able to target specific neighborhoods within municipalities and 
map properties, download and save property information, and enter in additional fields and 
notes unique to each user. Overall, the effort allows for both a unified subscription to the 
data and for data updates and mapping tools that many nonprofits do not have the capacity 
to compile in-house. The site was unveiled by CHAPA in October 2008 on the CHAPA Web 
site at www.chapa.org.
Since the initial release, the tool has already undergone a number of improvements. In 
addition to searching by street name, there are now more ways to target geographic areas—for 
example, by zip code or census tract. Some limited information can be exported to spread-
sheet software.     
The CHAPA website subscription is open to all organizations that have at least one 
employee who is a CHAPA member. As of January 2009, there were roughly 30 subscribers, 
including nonprofits, municipal offices, state agencies, and a handful of private developers. 
Recent improvements should mean that more cities and towns find the online tool useful.
The CHAPA website has the potential to support purchases of foreclosures by local enti-
ties, but it also could give municipal services like fire departments, police, and code enforcers 
a way to keep tabs on foreclosed properties in their neighborhoods. For keeping neigh-
borhoods stable, aggressive code enforcement in some places may be more effective than 
purchasing foreclosed properties. It is also likely to be cost-effective. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Recent Trends
There are preliminary signs that REO sales are now occurring. Chart 2 shows the buildup 
of the REO stock in Massachusetts, breaking out the data into two categories—inflows and 
outflows. 
Chart 2.  Inventory of REO Properties (inflows and outflows, 2006 – 2007)
Inflows occur when a foreclosed property does not sell at auction. Outflows occur when 
a lender-owned property is sold to an outside party. As shown, the number of REOs flowing 
into the stock is unabated as more troubled borrowers lose their homes. But the rise in 
outflows shows that although lenders typically buy the property back at auction, some sales 
out of REO are occurring.
This is also borne out anecdotally by activity among applications to the revolving loan 
fund, which has grown to $23 million with additional contributions. As of January 2009, 
the fund had been nearly fully committed, with approved applications for roughly 250 units 
by nonprofit community development corporations (CDCs), and in some cases private FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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developers who pledge to work within an overall strategic plan.5 While most of the approvals 
had not yet been purchased by nonprofits, in some cases CDCs have successfully purchased 
REO properties.
With  the  allocation  of  $4  billion  in  federal  funds  through  the  2008  Housing  and 
Economic Recovery Act, additional money should begin to flow in early 2009 from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development through states to organizations for the 
purpose of redeveloping foreclosed properties. Massachusetts has been allocated roughly $53 
million. Some of this funding will go directly to municipalities; most will go to the state to 
be administered by the Department of Housing and Community Development. 
Conclusion
Both the task force recommendations and the online database should facilitate the decision 
making of nonprofits, towns, and cities as they grapple with foreclosure. In a paper recently 
released by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, visiting scholar Allan Mallach laid out 
a set of principles to guide the use of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act money. The 
federal funds can be used for purchases, down-payment assistance, and counseling for buyers 
of foreclosed properties, land banking, and other uses. Mallach counsels groups to plan strate-
gically so as to avoid inefficiencies, which would harm the chances of receiving future monies 
for neighborhood stabilization. This argument, combined with groups’ knowledge of the 
neighborhood distress that occurred during previous downturns, should be incentive enough 
to get them to use the funds wisely. The practice of sharing information and resources, along 
with the availability of the online database, will help in Massachusetts.
Prabal Chakrabarti is assistant vice president of Community Affairs at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. He focuses on access to credit and capital and co-authored Venture Capital in Secondary Cities 
and Understanding Foreclosures in Massachusetts. Previously, he held analytical and research positions 
at the Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, the U.S. Treasury during the Clinton administration, and 
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5  According to Nancy Blueweiss at the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, citing data from Bruce Ehrlich at the 
Massachusetts Housing Investment Corporation. 
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